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Abstract
Aggregate taxable capital gains in UK have tripled in past decade. Using confidential ad-
ministrative data on the universe of UK taxpayers, we show that including gains changes the 
picture of UK inequality over the past two decades. These taxable gains are largely repackaged 
income, so their exclusion biases the picture of inequality. Including them changes who is at the 
top of the distribution, adding more business owners and older people. The share of income 
plus gains (both pre- and post-tax) going to the top 1% is 3pp higher than for income only, and 
this gap has been steadily rising.
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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades inequality has attracted increasing attention, with development of inter-
national data (Alvaredo et al., 2018a,b), even longer run series (Piketty and Saez, 2003; Moriguchi
and Saez, 2008; Bartels, 2017; Garbinti et al., 2018), and the development of Distributional National
Accounts (Alvaredo et al., 2016; Piketty et al., 2018). A recent strand of literature has studied
measurement of income sources for those at the top (Piketty et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2019). Smith
et al. (2019) highlight the role that income-shifting plays in changing the characteristics we associate
with those at the top: in particular, top earners largely receive income from human, not financial,
capital. This income-shifting is in large part driven by tax incentives to adjust the timing of in-
come receipts (le Maire and Schjerning, 2013; Miller et al., 2019). However, such incentives not
only encourage shifting between income forms, but from income into capital gains. The difference
in tax rates makes these incentives much larger, and the fungibility between income and gains is
precisely why the optimal tax literature regularly calls for common marginal rates between income
and gains (Slemrod, 1995; Slemrod and Kopczuk, 2002; Mirrlees et al., 2010; Blundell, 2012, 2016).
Since capital gains are not part of fiscal income, they are excluded from standard income inequality
measures. Including them can therefore not only change the pattern of receipts among those at the
top, but also which individuals are at the top, and what share of total remuneration they receive.
This paper studies the implications of including capital gains for measured inequality in the UK.
We combine confidential administrative data on the universe of UK taxpayers over more than two
decades to understand where gains come from, who receives them, and the implications for inequality.
We show three main results. First, capital gains are largely shifted income: they largely reflect
returns to human capital, rather than simply exogenous changes in the value of assets held. This
highlights the limitations of focusing on a narrow fiscal income definition when studying inequality,
since the line between income and gains is often blurred. Second, particularly at the narrowest top
shares, including gains substantially changes who is at the top. One in ten individuals in the top
1% when gains are included are not in the top 1% based on fiscal income alone. ‘Joiners’ to the top
1% are more likely to be business owners, to be older, and to be female than ‘stayers’ who are at the
top on either definition. Third, including gains substantially increases the share of total resources
going to those at the top, as well as the observed trend in top shares. Including gains increases the
pre-tax share of resources to the top 0.01% by 60% in 2017; their post-tax share almost doubles.
Strikingly, including gains also changes the narrative for UK inequality over the past two decades:
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while top fiscal income shares have remained largely constant since the late 1990s, once gains are
included there has been a large and sustained rise.
Capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than ordinary income. The top tax rate on labour income
in the UK is 47%, for dividends it is 38.1%, while on capital gains it is between 10% and 28%
depending on the type of underlying asset. In the US the top federal tax rate is 40.8% for income
from labour or ordinary dividends, while on capital gains it peaks at 23.8%, and similar patterns hold
elsewhere. The patterns we highlight are therefore likely to be of much broader relevance than to the
UK alone. They matter for the time series of top income shares, as incentives to shift remuneration
into gains vary with policy; for cross-country comparisons as these incentives vary across locations;
and for the type of individuals we see in top shares.
To establish where gains come from, we make use of capital gains tax filings. These document
not only the amount of gains received by individuals, but the asset classes from which they derive.
Around 71% of gains come from unlisted shares and ‘other assets’—a category comprising mainly
business assets eligible for ‘entrepreneurs’ relief’, which lowers the tax rate to 10%, compared with
a 20% standard rate. Such gains are substitutes for returns that could have been taken as capital
income, and may in many cases actually be repackaged labour income (Miller et al., 2019). A
further 5% of gains are from ‘carried interest’: payments for fund managers which depend on their
investment performance (human capital) rather than equity stake. As in the US, the UK treats
these as a return on investment. Three-quarters of all gains therefore come from returns that could
just as well have been received as income. Most of this will being missing from national income,
as well as from fiscal income, so will not show up in any measure of top share inequality based on
income only (Alvaredo et al., 2016; Piketty et al., 2018).1
To understand who receives these gains, we link capital gains and income tax records. We first
construct a measure of fiscal income using the deidentified administrative income tax data, to match
the commonly used ‘Survey of Personal Incomes’ (Atkinson, 2002, 2007; Jenkins, 2017; Joyce et al.,
2019). Combining it with capital gains tax records, we see that gains are extremely concentrated
at the top of existing income distribution.2 Around 50% of all gains by value go to the top 1% of
individuals ranked by income, compared to just 13% of all fiscal income. At the indivdual level, nine
out of ten people who are in the top 1% when ranking by income are also at the top when gains are
included. However, the one in ten ‘joiners’ to the top 1% by total remuneration (income plus gains)
1While national accounts will pick up the part of gains that come from disposal of businesses that previously had
retained earnings, they will not pick up intangibles like goodwill.
2It is also important to note that, conditional on having gains, the average amount of gains is similar across
most of the income distribution. Although this has little aggregate effect, exclusion of gains is therefore important for
understanding inequality further down the income distribution as well. Tables A1 and A2 provide the full distribution.
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look very different in terms of their characteristics. In line with our first result, and with Smith
et al. (2019), owners of businesses are much more likely to be at the top. Those at the top are also
substantially older, and more likely to be female. This change in ranking matters because, while
recent developments in inequality measurement are able to distribute all parts of national accounts,
they do this in proportion to components of fiscal income Piketty et al. (2018). By construction
they miss any components of inequality that change when gains are added to that series. If gains
were proportional to some income component, most likely dividends, then that might serve as a
proxy and receive higher weight when scaling up to the national accounts (even assuming all real
gains are captured in national accounts components). However, we see a prevalence among joiners
of individuals with majority pension income, as well as of investors, who would not receive such
scaling.
While the share of gains going to the top 1% has remained relatively constant over the past twenty
years, aggregate gains have risen sharply, tripling in the last decade. The share of total remuneration
going to the top has risen in parallel, from 14.1% in 2009 to 16.8% in 2018. By contrast the share
of income going to the top has been rising much more slowly: from 12.7% to 13.8% over the same
period. Using data on asset holding lengths, we show this pattern holds when gains are considered
on an accruals – rather than realisation – basis, while stripping out some of the excess volatility
caused by policy changes. Including gains not only changes the nature of inequality trends, but also
the apparent effectiveness of policy. Since gains are taxed at lower rates than income, the impact
of including gains on post-tax inequality is even larger; the lack of redistribution of gains highlights
again why they are a preferred form of remuneration for those that can repackage their income.
Top share series including gains have been considered before (Piketty and Saez, 2003; Moriguchi
and Saez, 2008; Alvaredo and Saez, 2009; Roine and Waldenstro¨m, 2012; Alvaredo et al., 2013;
Bartels, 2017). Authors have largely rejected these series in favour of an income only series, either
because adding gains makes little difference (Bartels, 2017) or because adding gains makes a big
difference to the volatility of the series (Piketty and Saez, 2003; Moriguchi and Saez, 2008; Alvaredo
et al., 2013). We show that excluding gains is problematic even when interest is primarily in income
inequality, because gains can contain a substantial share of shifted income. International differences
in the taxation of gains relative to income – as well as differences over time – will influence how large
an issue this is in a particular context, but exclusion of gains may bias down top income shares where
shifting into gains is occuring.3 While the volatility of realised gains series is understandably seen
3These differences also help explain why in some contexts authors found inclusion of gains to add little, while in
others they are substantial.
4
as unappealing, recent work studying estimating these on an accruals basis is likely to be preferred
to complete exclusion. Our top share series including accrued gains is no more volatile than the top
income series, but does pick out a different trend and level for top share inequality.
Including gains is also essential for understanding the characteristics of those at the top of the
distribution. Much of this debate has been about sources of income for those at the top (Piketty
and Saez, 2003; Piketty et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2019; Joyce et al., 2019). Including gains changes
the ranking of individuals, so changes who is at the top. This is not merely a matter of reshuffling
individuals with otherwise similar characteristics: the individuals joining the top are much older,
and are more likely to have the majority of their income from investment or pensions. Recent work
has highlighted how tax incentives change the apparent characteristics of those at the top, so that for
the same individuals more income appears to come from capital though economically it is repackaged
labour income (Smith et al., 2019). Our results show that these same types of incentives have effects
at the income to capital gains margin. Accounting for remuneration that has been completely shifted
out of income changes both how we interpret the economic activity of those at the top, and also
their individual characteristics. It also highlights the point made by Piketty and Saez (2006) that
‘[w]hen using tax data to study top incomes, it is necessary to analyze the tax structure at the same
time in order to tell real changes in income concentration from changes due to tax avoidance’, using
legal means to repackage reported incomes in order to reduce tax liability.
Specifically in the context of understanding UK top share inequality, we provide the first numbers
that take into account capital gains, and show that including these changes our understanding of
the past twenty years of top share inequality. Public data have previously only been available for
income, and on this basis top share inequality has been widely regarded as stable over the past
two decades (see Joyce and Xu, 2019, for a summary).4 We show that over the decade since the
financial crisis, the top 1% actually increased their share of total remuneration by almost 20% from
a base of 14.1%, whether on a realisation (2.7pp) or accruals (2.5pp) basis. The UK tax system
is also believed to be good at redistribution in terms of direct taxes (Bourquin and Waters, 2019).
However, we find that the state does very little redistribution of remuneration from gains, so that
post-tax inequality is actually higher than we previously thought pre-tax inequality was.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the policy context and data
sources. Section 3 explains the assets from which our observed capital gains are derived. Section 4
4This conclusion has also been used politically. Citing the latest top income share figures George Osborne, the
(then) UK Chancellor of the Exchquer, said in 2015 ‘Those with the broadest shoulders are bearing the greatest
burden...in the last fortnight we’ve seen independent statistics showing that since 2010 child poverty is down and so
is inequality’.
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shows how including gains changes the characteristics of those at the top. Section 5 describes the
level and trend of inequality once gains are included. Section 6 concludes.
2 Context and Data
2.1 UK institutional environment
A ‘capital gain’ is an increase in the value of an asset. For as long as an individual still owns the
asset, this increase is an ‘accrued’ gain: it is the gain that could be taken if the asset were to be
sold (or otherwise ‘disposed of’) now. When the asset is sold, the gain is ‘realised’: the individual
now knows for sure the change in value of the asset between acquisition and disposal.
Capital gains are heavily favoured as a form to take remuneration. The top tax rate on labour
income in the UK is 47%, including income tax and employee National Insurance Contributions; for
dividends it is 38.1%; while on capital gains it can be 10%, 20% or 28%. For gains the rate depends
largely on the type of underlying asset rather than the amount: the exception being that the 10%
rate is for business assets which qualify for Entrepreneurs’ Relief – business assets of owner-managers
– and these benefit from the lower rate up to a maximum lifetime value of £10 million. The 28%
rate applies to gains from residential property and from carried interest; the remainder is taxed at
a 20% rate.5
These rates provide a clear motivation for the shifting of remuneration from income into gains.
While less empirical evidence is available on this margin than on shifting between income tax bases,
there is clear evidence of repackaging labour income as capital income (Smith et al., 2019). Once
income is being taken via a corporate structure, in the form of dividends, it can just as well be
retained within the company, either to shift income over time (Browne and Phillips, 2017; Miller
et al., 2019) or to eventually liquidate the business and receive the value as gains. It also favours
low-yield, high growth investments that provide returns in the form of gains, rather than investments
that provide a more steady stream of capital income.
Gains are also quantitatively very important. In 2018 aggregate taxable gains were worth £55
billion, similar in magnitude to aggregate dividends paid to individuals (£58 billion). Gains have
been growing consistently over the past decade (Figure 1). Although realised gains were actually
higher in 2008, accrued gains have never been higher than now. That earlier spike in realisations was
partly driven by policy: it was announced during that tax year that in subsequent years indexataion
5In both cases, the rate is 10pp lower for individuals who pay only the basic rate of income tax, on gains that fall
between their taxable income and the maximum income within the basic rate band: £45,000 in 2018.
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allowance and taper relief – both policies which reduced the tax rate from gains on assets that had
been held for a long time – would be scrapped at the end of that tax year (Adam, 2008; Gammie,
2008).6 The lower level in the subsequent years is clearly a function both of the Financial Crisis and
of individuals having brought forward disposals to 2008 to benefit from the lower tax rate before it
ended.7
2.2 Measuring income inequality
Income inequality is most usually measured using fiscal income i.e. income assessable for tax. We
will not here attempt to do justice to the vast literature on whether (or under what conditions)
welfare is better measured using income or using consumption/expenditure. We only note that for
top-share inequality purposes a clear advantage of income data is the better coverage at the top of
the distribution, as well as potential availability going back many years based on tax records.
One risk is that our concept of interest becomes too narrowly shaped by what we happen to be
able to measure most easily. Fiscal income excludes, by definition, capital gains, since these are not
taxable income. In the context of inequality, this has three major drawbacks. First, to the extent
that income and gains are fungible, we may mismeasure income inequality. Since business incomes
are concentrated at the top of the income distribution, and incentives to switch (the income-gains
tax wedge) are larger at higher incomes, excluding gains is likely to underestimate inequality.
Second, excluding gains makes it harder to study the impact of policy on inequality. For example
an increase in capital gains tax might reduce income repackaging, increasing incomes at the top, and
making inequality appear to rise (Piketty and Saez, 2003). This will also show up in cross country
comparisons, where countries with a larger income-gains tax wedge may appear to have a relatively
lower top income share.
Third, if what we are ultimately trying to measure is command of resources (Haig, 1921; Simons,
1938), for a household a dollar from income is the same as a dollar from gains. In many contexts we
want to treat these differently – for example when measuring productivity we really want to know
what is value-added rather than exogenous shifts in asset prices – but for inequality it is harder to
understand why such a distinction should be relevant. It also means that we capture capital returns
for an individual who chose to buy high-yield lower-growth shares, so receives most of the return as
dividends, but not for someone holding low-yield high-growth shares, whose return will come largely
in gains. Completely excluding the financial returns from one but not the other seems perverse.
6See Appendix B.1 for policy details, and how we correct the series to construct figures on a consistent basis.
7See Auten and Clotfelter (1982) for more on the timing effects of capital gains taxes.
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It is important to note that despite its other advantages, the Distributional National Accounts
(DINA) method does not solve these drawbacks (Piketty et al., 2018). The DINA approach begins
with measures of fiscal income by income source across the distribution, and then assigns all com-
ponents of national income to individuals. It thereby produces a measure of inequality that also
aggregates up to the national accounts. Since it begins with the fiscal income data, it by construction
misses any components of inequality that occur when capital gains are added to that series. And
since capital gains are not part of the national accounts, these won’t be attributed to any indvidual:
this is deliberate for what DINA sets out to acheive – an inequality distribution that aggregates to
the national accounts – but means it misses other receipts that households receive.8
2.3 Data Sources
Our data are from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the UK tax authority. We observe
(reported) fiscal income and taxable capital gains for each individual in the population, over the
period 1997 to 2018.9
Income data come from two sources, which together comprise the universe of UK income tax
payers. First, we use UK income tax filing data. Around 11 million taxpayers (one-third of all income
tax payers) are required to file taxes: this includes all individuals with incomes above £100,000
(£40,000 before 2005), as well as individuals with incomes from sources where withholding is not
complete e.g. self-employment, partnership, and property income. The former condition means that
in principle filing data contain all individuals who are in the top 1% of the UK adult population.
However, individuals with large employment-only income typically still have their tax correctly
withheld, so until 2010 – since when filing compliance has been better enforced – there were some
individuals who did not file. We therefore supplement these data with records from the ‘PAYE’
(withholding) scheme, merging in to the filing data and keeping the cases which were not already
observed.
Information on capital gains also comes from the income tax filing data, since realised, taxable
gains are filed on the same form. These data include a breakdown of total gains into five main
asset classes: shares in public (listed) companies; shares in private (unlisted) companies; residential
8To the extent that gains are based on retained earnings, and these earnings are appropriately captured in the
national accounts, some of these will be being attributed to individuals. Whether this attribution is appropriate
depends on depend on the overlap between investors for income and investors for growth (Feldstein and Green, 1983).
If all individuals who invest have portfolios equally balanced between retained earnings and dividends paid, then
scaling up individual dividend income will capture these earnings. If instead some individuals own firms that focus
on paying dividends while others hold firms whose earnings are largely retained to liquidation, then scaling up will
attribute the earnings to the wrong individuals.
9UK tax years run from 6 April one year to 5 April the following year. We follow the same convention as the tax
authority in describing, for example, the tax year 2005/06 as 2006.
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property; the carried interest of fund managers; and a residual category of ‘other assets’. This last
category includes all assets to which Entrepreneurs’ Relief applies, regardless of specific asset type,
as well as other miscellaneous tangible and intangible assets such as collectable items (e.g. fine
artwork) and intellectual property.
Common to other countries where gains data are available, gains are only observed on realisation.
Individuals are asked to record acquisition and disposal dates for assets, but this is done in a free
text box, and so these details are not automatically ‘captured’ by the computer system. However,
HMRC manually codes up a sample of these each year (not linked to the records from which they
come) to get information on the distribution of asset holding lengths by asset type and disposal
value.10 We make use of this below to provide results also on an (estimated) accruals basis.
It is important to emphasise that our data include only realised, taxable capital gains. Quanti-
tatively the biggest exclusion from captial gains tax by far is owner-occupied housing, since main
homes are exempted. This is estimated to yield £170 billion in realised gains a year (Corlett et al.,
2020).11 This is much larger than the £55 billion in taxable gains observed in 2018, and is likely
to be weighted more towards the middle of the income distribution. There are two points to note
about this. First, as we describe below, a large proportion of taxable gains are actually repackaged
income, in constrast with gains from main homes. There is therefore a principled reason to want
to treat main homes differently. Second, even if we distribute all these gains to the bottom 99% of
the distribution, or distribute them equally with income, we still find the same qualitative results in
terms of rising inequality once taxable gains are included.
To construct top share series we also need information on control totals: the total number of
people in the UK adult population, and the total income/total income plus gains in the UK. For
the adult population figures we use the Office for National Statistics (ONS) mid-year population
estimates of the number of individuals aged 15 or more, following the standard adult population
definition for the UK in the context of top share inequality (Atkinson, 2007). For the total income
figures, we use the UK aggregate income series from the World Inequality Database (WID: Alvaredo
et al., 2018a). Where the WID denominator is missing – 2009, 2016, 2017, 2018 – we estimate these
based on growth rates in net national income over same period, starting from the WID figures for
years available. For the total income plus gains figures we add aggregate capital gains from our data
to the WID income control total.
10In 2017 a stratified sample of 7,500 cases was produced. See HM Revenue and Customs (2019) for details.
11Other exclusions include gains from assets that are held in Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs), and gains that
are realised through transfers between spouses, to charities, or on death. Gains below the tax-free allowance (currently
£12,000 per year) are also typically excluded. Collectively gains below the tax free allowance, from ISAs, and written
off at death are estimated to be around £31 billion Corlett et al. (2020).
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3 Where do gains come from?
Capital gains are the profits resulting from the sale of assets. Such profits come from some combi-
nation of exogenous changes in the price of existing unimproved assets, and value added produced
by providing capital and/or labour inputs. In most cases the latter can be thought of as substitutes
for income. For example, an increase in the profitability of an owner-managed business through
provision of human capital could be taken as higher pay, higher dividend income, or kept as retained
earnings that increase the value of the business on disposal (Slemrod and Kopczuk, 2002). Retained
earnings realised as gains will be excluded from fiscal income. Similarly, though harder to measure,
labour applied to improving the value of a rental property could be compensated through higher
rent receipts or through property sale. The increased value at sale will again not be reflected as part
of income.
To understand whether gains are largely substitutes for income, or simply shifts in asset prices,
we study the source from which they are derived.12 As described above, in the UK individuals
report not only the aggregate taxable capital gains they receive each year, but also a breakdown by
asset class: shares in public (listed) companies; shares in private (unlisted) companies; residential
property; the carried interest of fund managers; and a residual category of ‘other assets’, which
includes all assets to which Entrepreneurs’ Relief applies.
Figure 2 shows that gains come largely from repackaged income. Amongst those with gains
above £100,000 in 2017, half (49.6%) of their gains come from ‘other assets’; these are most likely
gains to which Entrepreneurs’ Relief applies, indicating returns to people who own and run their
own business. Almost a quarter (21.8%) of gains come from unlisted shares, and 5.5% come from
carried interest—essentially labour income for fund managers which for tax purposes is classified
as gains. A clear majority of gains therefore come from business activity rather than from passive
investment, and so often reflect a choice to receive remuneration in the form of gains rather than
wages or dividends.13 While such shifting between labour and capital income is well-documented
empirically (Miller et al., 2019; Smith et al., 2019), there has been less empirical evidence on shifting
between income and gains.
12As noted above, from the standpoint of inequality measurement we may also be interested in gains where an
active choice to take receipts as gains was not made.
13The composition of gains differs strikingly across the distribution, as shown in Figure A1. Residential property
makes up a substantial share of gains for those receiving between £100,000 to £200,000 in total gains; however, gains
in this type of asset are not very important in aggregate, because they hardly feature at the top of the distribution,
where most gains are concentrated. The carried interest received by fund managers makes up a similar amount, but
its distribution is reversed, as 85% of it goes to the top 5,000 individuals.
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Another striking feature of Figure 2 is how concentrated capital gains are in the UK. The top
5,000 people (0.01% of the adult population) receive 54% of all gains. Each individual in this group
receives at least £1.7 million per year in gains alone. For comparison, the top 5,000 people ranked
by taxable income receive just 2% of all fiscal income. To understand the relationship between gains
and income, we next describe the location of gains in the income distribution.
4 Who gains?
4.1 Where in the income distribution are gains?
We have already seen that capital gains are extrmely concentrated among a small number of gainers;
Figure 3a shows that those gainers are (perhaps unsurprisingly) largely at the top of the income
distribution. At the 80th percentile of the income distribution only 1.0% of people had any (taxable)
capital gains. By the 95th percentile this had risen to 3.3%, and by the 99th it was 15%. Among
those with gains, those who also have high incomes receive much larger gains on average: the mean
(median) gains for gain recipients with incomes below the 90th percentile of income was £46,400
(£12,200); for those in the top 1% by income it was £306,800 (£13,600).
This has two key implications. First, since gains are highly concentrated among those with high
incomes, we should expect to see higher top shares when gains are included. In 2018, 47% of all
capital gains went to the top 1% when ranked by income only; 92% went to the top 1% ranked on
total remuneration. Second, as seen from the medians, the gains distribution is heavily skewed. To
describe this more clearly, Figure 3b shows some percentiles of the distribution of gains among those
with positive gains at different points in the income distribution.14 From this it can be seen that
the tails of the unconditional gains distribution are comprised mainly of individuals at the top of
the income distribution: the largest gains go to those who already have the highest incomes.
Figure 3b makes clear that although gains are highly skewed, even further down the income
distribution there is a minority of individuals who receive substantial gains: gains that would be large
enough to put them into the top 1% even without any income.15 We next describe characteristics of
these individuals, who ‘join’ the top 1% when individuals are ranked on total remuneration despite
14Tables A1 to A2 give full tabulations of the distribution of gains across the income distribution. These will allow
authors working with income data to impute gains conditional on incomes.
15Figure A2 shows the distribution of gains among those at the top by total remuneration. There is clear bimodality,
with individuals at the top receiving almost all remuneration from gains, or almost all from income. This becomes
sharper in the higher top shares.
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not being at the top when ranking on fiscal income, comparing to those who remain at the top, and
those no longer at the top once gains are included.
4.2 Who are the new additions to the 1%?
One in ten people who are in the top 1% ranked by total remuneration were not in the top 1% by
fiscal income. We can compare these ‘joiners’ to the people they replace: the ‘leavers’ who were in
the top 1% by income but are no longer there once we include gains. The remaining nine in ten
people are ‘stayers’: those who are in the top 1% whether we rank on income only or on income plus
gains. Joiners include people who were already at the margins of the top 1% by income, for whom
a small amount in gains is enough to push them over the line, but also those who (as we saw above)
have minimal incomes but very large gains.
In terms of incomes, Figure 4a shows that joiners are less likely to be employees, and more
likely to be pensioners, investors and owner-managers. To classify individuals into types, we identify
individuals’ largest income-source from the following: employment income; self-employment trading
profits; partnership trading profits; income from state and private pensions; and investment income
(e.g. interest, rent, dividends). Where an individual’s single largest income-source is dividends and
they also report being a director of a closely-held company, we reallocate them to a distinct sixth
category of ‘owner-manager’. Additionally, a small proportion of joiners report no taxable income
at all.
The changing pattern of incomes among those at the top is consistent with gains representing
repackaged income. If gains were merely based on arms-length investments, employees and owner-
managers with the same income should be no more or less likely to benefit from these.16 Instead
owner-managers are almost twice (93%) more likely to be among joiners than leavers, while employees
are as third as likely (36%) to be among joiners. This is to be expected, since employees typically
have fewer opportunities to receive their remuneration in the form of gains, other than occasionally
through participation in employee share schemes. By contrast, owner-managers can keep profits
within their business and ultimately realise them as gains.
These results also highlight the limitations of approaches to inequality measurement based solely
on attributing national accounts components to individuals based on their fiscal income (Piketty
et al., 2018). While investors are 5.7 times as likely to be among joiners than leavers, pensioners are
also heavily over-represented being 3.8 times more likely to be among joiners. Even if all repackaged
16This argument is analagous to the Pissarides and Weber (1989) comparison between employees and the self-
employed, when trying to measure underreporting of income.
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income was observed in the national accounts, for example as retained profits, the DINA approach
would allocate these profits to individuals based on their dividend income. Individuals who otherwise
mostly have only pension income would not have their income scaled up in the same way, and so
would be incorrectly placed in the DINA income distribution. This then also matters for discussions
of the kind of people who can be found at the top.
In terms of other characteristics, joiners tend to be older (Figure 4b) and are more likely to
be female (Figure 4c). Half of joiners to the top 1% are over sixty, compared with only one in
seven leavers. By contrast more than half of stayers and leavers are under 50. A focus on incomes
suggests young(er) workers make up most of those at the top; including gains highlights the position
of individuals topping up their pensions with investment gains, as well as retiring owner-managers
realising large gains on exit from their business.
Joiners are also more likely to be female than leavers, although women still make up less than
half of this group. More than one-third (39%) of joiners are female, compared with only one-quarter
(23%) of leavers. This finding might be thought to indicate that the top 1% is more gender-equal
taking into account gains. However, it would be useful to understand better the mechanisms that
lead to this pattern. It might be that women make different investment decisions to men during
the lifecycle, so that they are more highly represented among top gainers than top incomes. It
could alternatively be that within a household assets are likely to be split so that the capital income
received can benefit from the lower marginal tax rate of the lower income partner (usually the
woman). In that case the higher prevalence of women only reflects intra-household income shifting,
which is then reflected in gains when assets are liquidated. Finally, it could be that women are
receipients of capital when partners die. However, the age distributions of male and female joiners
are very similar: if this were mostly about inheritance one would expect relatively fewer young
female joiners and more older female joiners. To definitively distinguish these mechanisms we would
need data linking individuals within a household—something that is not currently available in UK
administrative data.
One note of caution in interpreting these results is that gains here are measured on realisation.
A natural worry is that this means that gains received in a particular year should potentially be
attributed to multiple previous years and at the individual level will be volatile. It is worth noting
that these problems are not particular only to gains. As Miller et al. (2019) show, dividend income
is also responsive to policy and the timing of receipts is endogenous, so that dividend receipts
do not only reflect contemporaneous income. And although gains are less persistent than other
income sources, those other sources are also typically somwhat volatile. Figure A3 shows that the
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probability of remaining in the lowest (highest) quintile of capital gains (among those reporting
gains in 2018) was only 14.1% (16.6%). This is certainly lower than for self-employment income,
but the comparable numbers for self-employment income are still low, at 43.1% (72.9%). Figure A4
shows that among those with larger gains, there is substantial receipt of persistent large gains: one
in three (six) indviduals receiving more than £20,000 (£100,000) in 2017 received at least as much
on average over the previous four years.
Despite this, worries about ‘lumpiness’ are clearly greater in the context of capital gains. Ideally
one might circumvent such worries by directly observing the gains accrued each year. In the UK such
data are not collected, but for each year HMRC conducts a survey to understand the distribution
of acquisition dates by asset type. Using these tabulations, we can attribute gains to previous
years.17 We now discuss the implications of including capital gains on measured inequality, first
maintaining our headline (realisation) method for studying gains, but then also using our imputed
accruals measure.
5 Implications for measured inequality
We have shown that in many cases capital gains come from repackaged income, and have seen that
they are concentrated at the top of the fiscal income distribution. We next study the implications
of including gains on top-share income inequality.
5.1 Comparing top shares
Figure 5 shows how including capital gains increases the level of inequality in the UK, as measured
by the share of resources that go to individuals at the top. As described previously, 90% of those
in the top 1% by total remuneration (fiscal income plus capital gains) are also in the 1% by income
alone, indicating that gains are concentrated among those who already have high incomes. Ranking
people by their income only, the top 1% (around 500,000 people) received 13.8% of all income in
2018. To be in this group, you needed an income of above £125,000. When we add the capital gains
of these same people, their share of all income plus gains increases to 15.2%. This implies that each
person on average received an extra £47,000 in gains, in addition to their income.
Next we re-rank individuals, to account for the fact that one in ten individuals with the top 1%
by total remuneration are not included in the top 1% by fiscal income. This re-ranking increases
17Since tabulations are provided for time-bands of past years, our main results use the mid-point of each band.
Our results are not very sensitive to always using the end of the period, or using earlier in the period.
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the share of total remuneration going to the top 1% even further: from 15.2% (ranking on income
only) to 16.8% ranking on income plus gains. In 2018, to be in the top 1% you would have needed
at least £132,000; this is £8,000 more than if we measure (and rank on) income only.
These differences are much larger when looking towards the very top. Focusing on the top
0.01%, the top share increases 60% from 2.2% when measured and ranked on income, to 3.6% when
measured and ranked on total remuneration. This effect is mainly driven by re-ranking: before
re-ranking the top share becomes 2.4%. This again highlights the extent to which including gains
not only changes top shares, but also affects who is at the top.
For both the top 1% and 0.1%, these effects are not driven by the volatility of gains. As described
in Figures A3 and A4, gains are more volatile than other income sources, although at the top these
other sources are also volatile. Figure A5 shows that when defining the top share threshold based
on five-year-average gains, rather than contemporaneous gains, the nominal threshold for being at
the top barely changes (in each case it rises by around 1%). For the top 0.01% our results are more
affected by extremely high one-off realisations: the nominal threshold for being in the top 0.01%
share is 13% lower when using income plus five-year-averaged gains compared with current gains.
Motivated by this we next show the impact of gains on inequality trends, first on a realisations basis,
but subsequently on an accruals basis.
5.2 Inequality trend including realised gains
Including capital gains not only changes the level of inequality, but also the trend. Figure 1 showed
that realised capital gains have grown substantially over time, rising over the late 1990s and 2000s
to a peak in 2008, before falling away and then rising again up to the present. Since we know that
gains are concentrated at the top of the income distribution, this immediately suggests that adding
gains will change the time trend of inequality in the UK, as well as the level.
Figure 6a shows the share of income, and of total remuneration, going to the top 1%, as ranked
by income and by total remuneration respectively. Looking first at the pattern for income only, we
see the familiar result that the top 1% share has hovered consistently at around 14% for the past
decade, rising slightly between 1997 and the 2008 Financial Crisis, but hardly increasing since.
When gains are included, the share going to the top 1% is both higher and has been rising. The
difference between the two measures mirrors the pattern of aggregate gains over the same period.
Inequality, measured by the top 1% share of remuneration, was actually rising substantially in the
run-up to the Financial Crisis, peaking at 19.0% in 2008, compared with 14% on income only. Despite
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a subsequent decline shortly after this, inequality has again been rising over the past decade.18 Over
the full period the average annual rise in the 1% share of total remuneration is .08pp, compared
with .02pp for income only.
This pattern is exacerbated when we look at the top 0.1% and 0.01% shares over time (Figures 6b
and 6c). Since the Financial Crisis, the share of total remuneration going to the top 1% rose by
two and a half percentage points from 14.1% (in 2009) to 16.8% (in 2018), a rise of 19%. Over the
same period, the shares going to the top 0.1% and 0.01% both rose by around one third: from 6.1%
to 8.1% for the top 0.1% (around 50,000 people) and from 2.7% to 3.6% for the top 0.01% (around
5,000 people). Again these sharp rises stand in contrast to the much flatter increases seen in top
shares measured by fiscal income.
5.3 Inequality trends using accrued gains
One obvious limitation of the previous results is that they include capital gains at realisation. This
is when gains are directly observed, so is clearly most straightforward to implement. If there were
no correlation across individuals in the timing of realisation, then for aggregate purposes this may
not be problematic for our measure of the top shares even if at the individual level it suggests more
inequality within those top shares than we actually observe. But as Figure 1 showed, there are
correlated shocks in realisation: both policy and responses to aggregate asset prices are likely to
create correlations in when realisations occur, and both matter in 2008 which aggregate realised
gains peaked.
To overcome this, we estimate the capital gains on an accruals basis (Armour et al., 2013;
Alstadsæter et al., 2016; Lo´pez et al., 2016; Larrimore et al., 2017). This attempts to capture the
‘flow’ increase in the value of the assets over time. Ideally one would have a measure, at disposal,
of the length of holding. This would allow us to assign the realised gains to the appropriate time
period. UK tax microdata do not contain the information necessary to do this directly: individuals
are asked for this information, but they are asked to put it into a free text box on the form which is
not ‘captured’ by the computer system. However, HMRC do produce an annual survey to understand
the length time for which assets were held (see Section 2.3 for details). We use this information to
distribute realised gains over the time period for which the assets were held.
18It is important to note two features of this series. First, as noted before, the peak in 2008 is in part driven by
realisations of capital gains ahead of a policy change that reduced relief on long-held assets. In the next subsection
we show results on an accruals basis instead. Second, the dip in both the income and the total remuneration series
in the early-2010s is due to income-shifting behaviour, again driven by policy. The introduction of a higher top tax
rate, and subsequent announcement that it would be cut, led to substantial shifting in the timing of income receipts
among those with high incomes (Browne and Phillips, 2017).
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To distribute gains, we follow a six-step process (see Appendix B.2 for full details):
1. For gains realised in a particular year, we use the HMRC tabulations on length of holdings to
distribute them across acquistion years.
2. We then split the realised gains from each acquisition year equally over the time between
acquisition and disposal.19
3. We deflate these values from realisation year £ to acquisition year £, so it is on the same basis
as the income values.
4. We sum across acquisition years to get gains accrued in each year.
5. We then adjust recent years (2012 and later) to account for gains that have been accrued for
these years but have not yet been realised.
6. Finally we impute accrued gains to the top shares according to the shares of realised gains
that they received that year.
On an accruals basis the time path of gains is much smoother, ‘only’ doubling between 1997
and the peak in 2006, before falling back and then increasing more smoothly up to the present.
Figure A6 shows graphically the time path of aggregate capital gains on our estimated accruals
basis, compared with gains on the realisation basis. As well as being smoother overall, gains are
higher and rising more slowly in the early part of our data. The 2007 and 2008 peak is no longer
present, and subsequently the level of gains is then similar on both measures.
Top share inequality based on income plus accrued gains is on average slightly higher, has been
increasing slightly more slowly, and is much less volatile than with realised gains. Figure 7 shows
the time path of top shares based and ranked on income plus accrued gains, compared with the
usual income only series. In each case the most obvious difference relative to realised gains is that
the volatility in the series is now almost entirely driven by changes in top incomes. Accounting for
accrued gains also increases the top share of total remuneration by an average of 0.3pp relative to
the realised gains series. Most of these additional gains come earlier in the series—consequently the
average annual increase in the top 1% share is .06pp rather than the previous .08pp. However, the
rise in inequality is still substantially faster than when income only is considered (.02pp per year),
and the level of inequality is almost 2pp higher.
19An alternative approach would be to use data on asset prices to create an accruals series that was more responsive
to macro shocks.
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5.4 Post-tax inequality
Post-tax resources are likely to be more relevant for individual experiences of inequality than pre-
tax. It is therefore useful to consider the implications of including gains on post-tax, as well as
pre-tax inequality. This is of particular relevance in the context of gains because the motivation for
repackaging income into gains is precisely driven by their lower tax rate.
Among those within the top 1% by total remuneration, the mean share of total remuneration
that comes from gains is rising. Figure 8 shows, for deciles of the top 1% by total remuneration in
2017, that gains are heavily concentrated in the top decile: 38.8% of remuneration in the top decile
(effectively top 0.1%) is from gains compared with only 13.6% in the next decile, and 4.8% for the
lowest decile. Further, taxpayers at the very top are more likely to receive gains that are taxed at
lower rates. More than half (52.8%) of gains for those in the top decile of the 1% are taxed at 10%,
compared with only 39.5% in the next decile, and 18.7% in the lowest decile of the top 1%.
Access to these low tax rates reduces the ability of the tax system to effectively redistribute
income. The share of total income going to the top 1% after tax is 9.3% in 2017, compared to 13.3%
before tax (Figure 9), a reduction of 30%. As already noted, the share of total remuneration going
to individuals at the top (16.0% for the top 1%) is larger than the share of total income going to
the top. Low tax rates on capital gains also mean that for total remuneration the tax system is less
progressive than for total income. Taxes only reduce the top share of total remuneration by 23%, so
that they receive 12.3% of the aggregate. This is similar to the share of income they receive pre-tax.
This pattern is even more pronounced among the extremely rich. The top 0.01% of individuals
by income receive 2.0% of income pre-tax, but only 1.3% post-tax. Based on total remuneration the
top 0.01% receive 3.3% of aggregate remuneration pre-tax, and still keep 2.8% post-tax.
6 Conclusion
These findings change the story of top income inequality in the 2010s. Although top incomes as
measured in official statistics did not increase significantly, this masks an important shift in the way
that the richest received their remuneration. Inequality had not abated, just taken a different form.
In contrast with publically available microdata, using administrative tax data on the population of
taxpayers allows a study of the role of capital gains. These are not included in microdata based
on admin sources, such as the SPI, and their concentration means they are difficult to effectively
measure in household surveys.
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Our results speak to the growing research agenda on inequality measurement. Recent work
has focused on capturing resources not measured by fiscal income (Piketty et al., 2018) and on
understanding the economic sources behind reported incomes (Smith et al., 2019). In taking this
agenda further, it will be important to further study shifting across tax bases. This is particularly
important when comparing internationally, across countries with very different incentives for such
shifting.
This work also has implications for tax policy. The typical case for low taxes on capital gains
is to avoid distorting investment decisions. However, this comes at a price. First, it creates strong
incentives to repackage income as gains. Second, to the extent that gains are received unequally, it
is less able to redistribute out of gains. We see both that income repackaging is occuring, and that
the tax system is ineffective in redistributing these resources. There are therefore both efficiency
and equity reasons for taxing gains more similarly to income.
Finally, unless a wider definition of income is adopted in official statistics, we are liable to
continue to miss important trends in inequality. Focusing narrowly on fiscal income definition of
income excludes both non-taxable income and remuneration not treated as income. While our focus
has been on the latter, there is clearly scope for work studying the implications of non-taxable income
for measured inequality. These are typically a combination of non-taxable state transfers, which are
concentrated at the bottom of the distribution, and types of investment income (for example, ISAs
in the UK) which are likely concentrated at the top. Getting a comprehensive picture of inequality
requires taking something of a more holistic approach to income measurement.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Aggregate capital gains, 1997-2018
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains going to individuals. Prior to 2009, our measure
of gains differs from HMRC aggregates. Our series describes the full nominal gains realised by taxpayers, whereas
the main series provided by HMRC shows gains after taper relief and indexation allowances—policies which reduce
the amount of gains on which tax was due. These policies were removed from 2008, as noted in the figure. See
Appendix B.1 for details.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure 2: Distribution of gains among those with ≥£100,000 in gains, and
breakdown by source
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains going to individuals in 2017. Individuals are
ranked by reported capital gains and grouped into bins of 1000. Only individuals with gains over £100,000 shown
here. Bars show democratic mean gains within each bin, and breakdown of these by asset type. ‘Carried interest’
is remuneration for fund managers, which is reported and taxed as a capital gain. ‘Other assets’ is predominantly
composed of assets eligible for ‘entrepreneurs’ relief ’ – a 10% tax rate for owner-managers on disposals relating
to their business – though it also contains miscellaneous tangible and intangible assets including fine artwork and
intellectual property.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure 3: Gains across the income distribution
(a) Share of individuals with gains, and mean conditional on any gains
(b) Percentiles of gains, conditional on any gains
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains and reported fiscal income going to individuals in
2017. Individuals are ranked by fiscal income (constructed as ‘total income’ from the Survey of Personal Incomes),
and then grouped into percentiles of the 15+ population using the ONS mid-year population estimates to give the
population control total. Since individuals below the 40th percentile are not necessarily in the income tax data –
either because they have no income, or because their income is below the ‘personal allowance’ so may not be reported
– we group these individuals into a single ‘< 40’ category. In Panel (a), the share of individuals with any gains is
shown on a log scale on the left-hand axis; mean gains among those receiving gains at each percentile is shown on
the righ-hand axis. In Panel (b), lines show percentiles of the capital gains distribution at each percentile of the total
income distribution.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure 4: Who remains in, leaves, or joins the top 1% when capital gains
are taken into account?
(a) Main income source (b) Age
(c) Sex
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains and reported fiscal income going to individuals
in 2017. ‘Stayer’ includes all individuals who are in the top 1% of the 15+ population when ranked by fiscal income
and when ranked by total remuneration (the sum of fiscal income and capital gains). ‘Leaver’ includes all individuals
who are in the top 1% of the 15+ population when ranked by fiscal income, and are not in the top 1% when ranked
total remuneration. ‘Joiner’ includes all individuals who are in the top 1% of the 15+ population when ranked by
total remuneration, and are not in the top 1% when ranked fiscal income. The 15+ population control total is from
the ONS mid-year population estimates. In Panel (a), the bars are divided into shares of individuals whose main
source income is from employment, self-employment, partnerships, pensions, or investment. There is also a category
for ‘owner-managers’: individuals who are directors of closely held companies and report investment as their main
source. Among joiners, the ‘no income’ category comprises individuals with no reported income but whose gains are
large enough to bring them into the top 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure 5: Top shares of income and total remuneration, 2017
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains and reported fiscal income going to individuals in
2017. ‘Income only’ shows the proportion of all fiscal income going to the top 1%, 0.1%, 0.01% of the 15+ population.
‘Including gains, ranked by income only’ shows the proportion of total remuneration (fiscal income and realised gains)
going to the top 1%, 0.1%, 0.01% of the 15+ population ranked by fiscal income. ‘Including gains, re-ranked’ shows
the proportion of total remuneration (fiscal income and realised gains) going to the top 1%, 0.1%, 0.01% of the 15+
population ranked by total remuneration. The 15+ population control total is from the ONS mid-year population
estimates.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure 6: Share of income or income+gains going to the top, 1997-2018
(a) Top 1%
(b) Top 0.1%
(c) Top 0.01%
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains and reported fiscal income. ‘Income only’ shows
the proportion of all fiscal income going to the top 1%, 0.1%, 0.01% of the 15+ population ranked by fiscal income.
‘Including gains’ shows the proportion of total remuneration (fiscal income and realised gains) going to the top 1%,
0.1%, 0.01% of the 15+ population ranked by total remuneration. The 15+ population control total is from the ONS
mid-year population estimates.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure 7: Share of income or income+accrued gains going to the top,
1997-2018
(a) Top 1%
(b) Top 0.1%
(c) Top 0.01%
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains and reported fiscal income. ‘Income only’ shows
the proportion of all fiscal income going to the top 1%, 0.1%, 0.01% of the 15+ population ranked by fiscal income.
‘Including accrued gains’ shows the proportion of fiscal income and accrued gains going to the top 1%, 0.1%, 0.01% of
the 15+ population ranked by income plus accrued gains. The 15+ population control total is from the ONS mid-year
population estimates. See Appendix B.2 for details on how accruals are estimated.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure 8: Share of total remuneration from income and from gains at
different tax rates
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains and reported fiscal income going to individuals
in 2017. Shows, among those already in the top 1% by total remuneration, the breakdown of that remuneration by
decile into total income, and capital gains taxed at different rates.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure 9: Top shares of income and total remuneration before and after
tax, 2017
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains and reported fiscal income going to individuals
in 2017. ‘Total Income, pre-tax’ shows the proportion of all fiscal income going to the top 1%, 0.1%, 0.01% of
the 15+ population pre-tax. ‘Total Income, post-tax’ shows the proportion of all fiscal income going to the top 1%,
0.1%, 0.01% of the 15+ population after income tax and national insurance contributions are subtracted. ‘Total
Remuneration, pre-tax’ shows the proportion of all fiscal income plus gains going to the top 1%, 0.1%, 0.01% of
the 15+ population pre-tax. ‘Total Remuneration, post-tax’ shows the proportion of all fiscal income plus gains
going to the top 1%, 0.1%, 0.01% of the 15+ population after income tax, capital gains tax, and national insurance
contributions are subtracted. The 15+ population control total is from the ONS mid-year population estimates.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Appendices
Appendix A Additional Tables and Figures
Figure A1: Share of gains by source among those with ≥£100,000 in gains
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains going to individuals in 2017. Individuals are
ranked by reported capital gains and grouped into bins of 1000. Only individuals with gains over £100,000 shown
here. Bars are scaled to 100, and show within each bin the breakdown of gains by asset type. ‘Carried interest’
is remuneration for fund managers, which is reported and taxed as a capital gain. ‘Other assets’ is predominantly
composed of assets eligible for ‘entrepreneurs’ relief ’ – a 10% tax rate for owner-managers on disposals relating
to their business – though it also contains miscellaneous tangible and intangible assets including fine artwork and
intellectual property.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure A2: Share of remuneration from gains, among those with high total
remuneration
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains and reported fiscal income going to individuals
in 2017. Lines show, for individuals in the top 1%, 0.1%, 0.01% ranked on total remuneration (the sum of fiscal
income and capital gains), the distribution of individuals with different shares of total remuneration coming from
capital gains.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure A3: Probability of remaining in same quintile, by remuneration
source
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains going to individuals in 2017. Red (blue) bars
show the share of individuals receiving income/gains from a particular source who are in the lowest (highest) qunitile
in both 2017 and 2018, effectively measuring persistence.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure A4: Mean gains over previous four years for individuals with 2017
gains of:
(a) More than £100,000
(b) Between £20-100,000
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains going to individuals in 2017. Bars show the
share of individuals receiving different mean amounts of gains between 2013 and 2016, given that they received more
than £100,000 in 2017 (Panel a) or £20-100,000 in 2017 (Panel b).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure A5: Level of income or remuneration needed to be in top shares
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains and reported fiscal income going to individuals
in 2017. ‘Total Income’ shows the level of income needed to be in the top 1%, 0.1%, 0.01% of the 15+ population
ranked on income. ‘Total Income + Capital Gains’ shows the level of income plus capital gains needed to be in the
top 1%, 0.1%, 0.01% of the 15+ population ranked on income plus gains. ‘Total Income + Capital Gains (5-year
average)’ shows the level of income plus five-year-averaged capital gains needed to be in the top 1%, 0.1%, 0.01%
of the 15+ population ranked on income plus averaged gains. The 15+ population control total is from the ONS
mid-year population estimates.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
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Figure A6: Aggregate capital gains on an accruals basis, 1997-2018
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains going to individuals. ‘Realised gains’ contains
reported taxable capital gains at realisation, as in Figure 1. ‘Accrued gains (unadjusted)’ distributes realisations over
previous years, using holding length data. ‘Accrued gains (adjusted)’ scales up the unadjusted distribution to account
for gains accrued that will be realised in the future. See Section 5.3 for details on how accrued gains are estimated
from realised gains.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative and survey datasets.
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Appendix B Data Construction
B.1 Calculating realised gains
We measure taxable capital gains using microdata collected from tax form SA108 (‘Capital Gains
Summary’). Our population for gains covers all individuals who reported gains. We do not include
gains on assets held in trust, which are reported by trustees (trust gains totalled £3.3 billion in
2018).
From 2009 onwards, our measure is the full nominal gain liable to Capital Gains Tax, net of any
in-year losses. We exclude any losses brought forward from previous years, since these are captured
in the year in which the losses were realised.
Until 2008 the reported gains are complicated by two policies: taper relief and indexation al-
lowance. Taxpayers reported their net gains after adjusting for the benefits provided by these gains.
Taper relief applied on disposals between 1999 and 2008 to reduce the proportion of the reported
gain liable to capital gains tax. The relief was larger the longer an asset had been held. A faster
taper rate applied to business than to non-business assets, and the taper structure for business assets
was adjusted on several occasions during this period. Our measure of gains is not directly impacted
by this relief because our microdata allows us to observe the amount of gain before the relief was ap-
plied. However, the policy can be expected to have had a significant impact on taxpayer behaviours,
in particular by strongly favouring business assets held for at least two years, for disposals made
between 2003 to 2008.
Indexation allowance also applied on disposals until 2008. From 1988, gains accruing before 1982
were in effect free of tax, as the value of the asset was rebased to its market value March 1982.
Nominal gains accruing since 1982 were reduced by a factor equal to the increase in the Retail Price
Index over the period for which the asset had been held, such that only the real gain was taxable.
From 1999 until 2008, indexation allowance was frozen (having been replaced by taper relief), such
that the part of the gain that accrued between March 1982 to March 1998 continued to be reduced
by indexation allowance, but the full nominal gain after March 1998 was taxable, although eligible
for taper relief. The microdata do not enable us to observe directly the full amount of the nominal
gain prior to indexation allowance at the individual level. However, we are able to make an aggregate
adjustment to our results that recovers the full nominal gain, to achieve a measure that is consistent
with the definition of gains applying to disposals from 2009 onwards, when indexation allowance was
completely abolished.
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To do this, we use tables published by HMRC on the breakdown of assets liable to CGT by holding
period—the length of time for which the asset had been held prior to disposal (see Section 2.3). These
tables are compiled by HMRC based on a stratified sample of SA108 returns: for this sample HMRC
manually codes the dates of acquisition and disposal based on information provided by the taxpayer
on the form. The length of period of ownership information is presented in bins of one or more years,
including open-ended bins (e.g. 10yrs+). For 1997-2008 this information was reported in specific
boxes on the SA108 return. From 2009 onwards, this information was included as free text in the
‘additional information’ box, leading to an increase in the proportion of assets of ‘unknown’ holding
duration after 2008.
To undo the effect of indexation allowance, we take the following steps for each tax year:
1. Use HMRC holdings length table to construct aggregate gains and disposals by ‘year of acqui-
sition’ as follows:
(a) For each holding length we sum across all asset types, to construct an all-asset holding
length distribution.
(b) For assets of unknown holding length, we assign disposal value to the known bins in
proportion to disposal value in each bin, and assign gains to the known bins in proportion
to gains in each bin
(c) Within each holding-length bin, we distribute disposals/gains evenly to each tax year
within bin, based on mid-point within tax years.
(d) For upper unbounded bin: we distribute unallocated gains beyond the period covered by
bounded bins by reducing the yearly allocation of acquisitions by 30% every 5 years until
the full amount is reached.20
(e) For years 1997 and 1999 where HMRC holdings tables are unavailable, we assume the
same distribution of holding lengths as in 1998; for 2018 where they are not yet released,
we use 2017.
(f) Finally, we scale gains in HMRC tables to match aggregate gains based on SA108 micro-
data.
2. For each ‘year of acquisition’ bin, we subtract aggregate gains from aggregate disposal value
to give aggregate acquisition value.
20Bounded bins in the HMRC tables go back only 10 years in some year, and up to 25 years in others. The years
with a longer span of bins indicate roughly a 30% reduction in asset age between 5-10 and 10-15 year bins, and another
30% between 10-15 and 15-20 year bins.
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Figure B1: Aggregate capital gains once indexation allowance is removed,
1997-2008
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains going to individuals. See Section B.1 for details
on how indexation allowance is removed. Upper, central, and lower estimates refer to different assumptions about the
holding length period for gains where holding length is recorded as unknown. Series only runs to 2008, as indexation
allowance then abolished so microdata are already without indexation allowance.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative and survey datasets.
3. For tax year bins between 1982-1998, we multiply the aggregate acquisition value by the
appropriate indexation factor, taking the mid-point in the tax year (October), to give the
aggregate amount of Indexation Allowance. We take indexation factors from the Indexation
Factor table in Inland Revenue (1999). These factors are based on the change in Retail Price
Index over the period until March 1998.
4. To recover the full nominal gain before indexation allowance for each realisation year, we sum
gains based on SA108 microdata (before taper relief but after indexation allowance) with the
indexation allowance for that realisation year aggregating across acquisition years.
These steps produce our ‘central estimate’ of gains before indexation allowance. For the ‘lower
estimate’, we assume that all of the assets in the ‘unknown’ bin were acquired in the current year
and that all of the assets in the unbounded upper bin were acquired in the most recent possible year.
For the ‘upper estimate’, we assume that all of the assets in both the ‘unknown’ bin and the upper
unbounded bin were acquired in 1982 (the earliest possible year, after rebasing). Figure B1 shows
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Figure B2: Impact of indexation allowance on estimates of top shares,
1997-2018
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains and fiscal income going to individuals. See
Section B.1 for details on how indexation allowance is removed. The solid red series shows our main series, as
elsewhere in the paper, after indexation allowance is removed, using the ‘central’ assumption on how this is done.
The dashed red series shows the series without making adjustments for indexation allowance.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative and survey datasets.
how our estimates of aggregate gains before indexation allowance (and taper relief) vary with these
assumptions about the distribution of unknowns. The pattern since 2002 is similar across all cases,
although the level is higher when we assume all unknowns were acquired at the earliest possible
period. Prior to 2002 there is a bit more variation in the size of the effect, both in terms of the
difference from the unadjusted series, and across the different cases. Henceforth we focus on the
central estimate
Figure B2 shows how accounting for indexation allowance, as we do in our primary specification,
changes our top 1% series. Not accounting for this adjustment would lead nominal realised taxable
gains to have been lower in the early part of our series, and have no effect subsequently. Hence
without adjustment inequality would appear to be rising even faster.
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B.2 Estimating Accruals
To estimate gains on an accruals basis, we need to distribute realised gains back over the period in
which they were held. We follow a six-step process:
1. For gains realised in a particular year, we use the HMRC tabulations on length of holdings
to distribute them across acquistion years. To do this we follow the approach describe in
Appendix B.1.
2. We then split the realised gains from each acquisition year equally over the time between
acquisition and disposal, again as above.21
3. We sum across acquisition years to get gains accrued in each year, first adjusting for (the
central estimate of) indexation allowance as previously.
4. We deflate these values from realisation year £ to acquisition year £, so it is on the same basis
as the income values.
5. We then adjust recent years (2012 and later) to account for gains that have been accrued for
these years but have not yet been realised. To do this:
• We estimate the share of accrued gains that are based on acquisitions within the current
year, between one and two years ago, and so on. We do this between 2009 and 2011.22
• We then assume those shares remain constant in more recent years, and scale up the
observed accruals to account for unrealised gains. For example, the data suggest assets
held for less than one year account for 20% of gains from assets acquired in the last ten
years, suggesting gains in the most recent year should be scaled by a factor of five.
6. Finally we impute accrued gains to the top shares according to the shares of realised gains
that they received that year.
Figure B4 shows the effect of doing this procedure on the total value of accrued gains, scaling up
only the last observed year in any series. The solid blue line is the unadjusted accruals series. The
dotted red line shows the affect of scaling up just the 2018 realisation (within year) to account for
gains that would – on past performance – be expected to be realised in the subsequent ten years.
21An alternative approach would be to use data on asset prices to create an accruals series that was more responsive
to macro shocks.
22Figure B3 shows how the share of assets from different holding lengths over time. Clearly there is a change
in behaviour between the recent past and the period up to 2008 when a different policy regime was in place. That
regime explicitly encouraged slightly longer holding durations. Hence we do not use that period for estimating current
durations, as it would likely lead to a vast overestimate of the amount of currently accruing gains.
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Figure B3: Share of realised gains (by value) held for different holding
lengths, 1997-2018
Notes: Constructed using data on reported holding lengths for capital gains realised by individuals. Each line shows
the share of all gains realised in that year (by value) that were held for a particular length of time.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC holding length survey.
The dashed blue lines show the effect of using only data up to some earlier year and only scaling
the latest year that we assume we have, to give a sense for how sensible this approach is. Clearly
with fewer years of data we underestimate the unadjusted accruals series by more, but we also see
that the scaling approach looks relatively conservative. Only from 2014 do we estimate that there
will ultimately be more accrued gains than we have currently observed.
Figure B5 repeats the exercise, but now for any given ‘final’ year, scaling up all of the last ten
years to account for any gains expected over the subsequent ten years. Now the adjusted series looks
closer to the unadjusted series up until 2009, after which it begins to diverge substantially from the
unadjusted series, with ultimately the same 2018 end point. This is the approach we take to produce
our capital gains on an accruals basis series in Figures 7 and A6
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Figure B4: Estimating aggregate capital gains on an accruals basis, ad-
justing only the final year to account for future realisations, 1997-2018
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains going to individuals. See Section B.2 for details
on how accrued gains are estimated from realised gains. The solid blue line is the unadjusted accruals series. The
dotted red line shows the affect of scaling up just the 2018 realisation (within year) to account for gains that would –
on past performance – be expected to be realised in the subsequent ten years. The dashed blue lines show the effect of
using only data up to some earlier year and only scaling the latest year that we assume we have. The orange dashed
line picks this out for 2012, for ease of reading.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative and survey datasets.
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Figure B5: Estimating aggregate capital gains on an accruals basis, ad-
justing the final ten years to account for future realisations, 1997-2018
Notes: Constructed using data on all reported taxable capital gains going to individuals. See Section B.2 for details
on how accrued gains are estimated from realised gains. The solid blue line is the unadjusted accruals series. The
dotted red line shows the affect of scaling up in 2018 the past ten years for accruals that are expected to have happened
but not been realised by 2018, but expected within ten years of that point in time. The dashed blue lines repeat this to
show the effect of this procedure assuming we have data only to some earlier date, for comparison with the outturns.
The orange dashed line picks this out for 2012, for ease of reading.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HMRC administrative and survey datasets.
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